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There is, perhaps, no language in the Constitu- information provided by sources whose character
tion that has given the courts more difficulty than and motives dictate a valid judicial concern for an
the fourth amendment's command that "no war- informant's reliability. However, in light of this
rant shall issue, but upon probable cause." The concern, the courts may well have overreacted by
pages of precedent are literally covered with judi- developing an inflexible rule structure for the
cial attempts to interpret this phrase so as to strike quantum of information about the informant's rea balance between the legitimate needs of law en- liability that should be contained in an application
forcement and the right of the citizenry to be free for a search warrant. As a surface matter, the
from unreasonable interferences with privacy and rigidity of existing rules would seem to require that
unfounded charges of crime. However, since the all information provided the police be tested by the
Supreme Court first held that warrants may not same reliability standards. But it is anomalous that
issue upon mere suspicion but must be supported similar reliability considerations should exist when
by facts amounting to probable cause,' there has a warrant is sought on the basis of information probeen continuous debate over the degree of speci- vided by a citizen who is the victim of, or witness
ficity necessary to secure a search warrant. One to, a crime, as when, for example, the classic "stool
school of thought suggests that the Supreme Court pigeon" provides information. To the extent that
has gone too far in creating a rigid, academic law enforcement officers must meticulously demonformula that is not only incomprehensible to police strate the reliability of the citizen informant and
officers, but too technical for judges to apply with the "stool pigeon" in the same technical way, time
any degree of consistency.2 On the other hand, and effort are needlessly expended and, where techthere are those who maintain that a citizen is not nical requirements are not met, reliable evidence is
secure from unjustified intrusions upon privacy un- needlessly excluded.
less the police comply with exacting standards of
This article will focus on a concept in the emfactual specificity before obtaining a search war- bryonic stages of development-the citizen informant doctrine-which has been accepted in varyrant.'
A focal point of confrontation between these di- ing degrees in some jurisdictions and represents a
vergent viewpoints concerns the extent to which solution to the problem suggested above. Briefly
an application for a search warrant based on hear- stated, this doctrine permits the issuance of a search
say information must demonstrate the reliability warrant on the basis of information supplied by an
of the individual providing the information. Con- ordinary citizen who observes the commission of a
cededly, many warrant applications are based on crime without regard to particularized considera* J. D., Northwestern University School of Law; tions of reliability. Before attempting to articulate
Member, Illinois Bar; United States Attorney for the and crystallize the doctrine, it is necessary to place
Northern District of Illinois; former Associate Profes- it in the historical context of the fourth amendsor of Law, Northwestern University.
**A. B., University of Illinois; J.D., Northwestern emnt cases.
University School of Law; Member, Illinois Bar;
The decisions of the Supreme Court in fourth
Assistant United States Attorney, Special Investiga- amendment cases "point in differing directions and
tions Division, Northern District of Illinois.
The views expressed herein are the authors' own and differ in emphasis. No trick of logic will make them
do not necessarily reflect those of the United States all perfectly consistent."4 However, the Court has
Department of Justice.
I See Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41 (1933). consistently emphasized that, wherever possible,
2See generally Carrington, Speaking for the Police,
61 J. Cane. L.C. & P.S. 244 (1970); T. TAYLOR, Two searches should be conducted pursuant to a warrant
SUDnrs mi CoNsntTIonAL I-TERPnETATIOx 23-24 so that a neutral and detached judicial officer is
(1969).
3See generally Comment, Search and Seizure in the
4 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 483
Supreme Court: Shadows of the Fourth Amendment, 28 (1971). See La Fave, Search and Seizure, "The Course
U. Car. L. REv. 664, 687 (1961). Cf. W. SCHAEPR, of Trite Law... Has Not ...Run Smooth", 1966 U.
THE SuspzcT AN SocirEY (1966).
ILL. L.F. 255.
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interposed between the officer and his suspect. 5 In
addition to its preference for the use of search warrants, the Court has attempted to insure that the
magistrate's function is more than that of a "rubber stamp" for the law enforcement officer. 6 The
issuing officer is compelled to make an independent
evaluation of the reliability of the facts put forth
by the complaining officer. Under no circumstances
can he rely upon "a mere affirmation of suspicion
and belief without any statement of adequate sup7
porting facts."
The function of the magistrate became more
delicate with the abolition of the requirement, imposed by some courts,8 that the complaining officer
possess personal knowledge of facts amounting to
a criminal offense. The demise of that doctrine with
respect to warrantless arrests 9 opened the way for
- See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S.
443, 449-51 (1971); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 357 (1967); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10
(1948).
6
But compare W. LA FAvE, ARREST: TiE DxcisioN
To TAKE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY 502-03 (1965):
The assumption apparently is that greater protection for the individual is afforded by the warrant
procedure, since an arrest will be made only if an
impartial judicial officer, upon careful evaluation
of the evidence presented to him, determines that
adequate grounds for an arrest exist. But, at least
in [some states] it is clear that the warrant process
does not serve this function. Rather, the decision is
made in the office of the prosecutor and the judge
routinely signs the arrest warrant without any
independent inquiry into the facts and circumstances of the individual case.
See also Miller & Tiffany, ProsecutorDominance of the
Warrant Decision: A Study of Current Practices, 1964
WAsir. U.L.Q. 1, 17.
7 Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41, 46 (1933).
The standards used to test for probable cause are the
same whether a search warrant, as in Nathanson, or an
arrest warrant is being sought. See, e.g., Giordenello v.
United States, 357 U.S. 480, 485 (1958); United States
v. Roth, 391 F.2d 507, 509 n.2 (7th Cir. 1967). Cf.
Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 417 n.5 (1969);
Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964) (standard of
probable cause necessary to arrest without a warrant
is essentially the same). Because of this identity,
authorities involving all of these factual situations will
be used interchangeably when reference is made to their
common
legal principles.
8
See, e.g., Simmons v. United States, 18 F.2d 85, 88
(8th Cir. 1927); Wagner v. United States, 8 F.2d 581
(8th Cir. 1925); Giles v. United States, 284 F.208
(1st Cir. 1922); United States v. Novero, 58 F. Supp.
275, 279 (E.D. Mo. 1944); Reeve v. Howe, 33 F. Supp.
619, 622 (E.D. Pa. 1940). Compare Mueller v. Powell,
203 F.2d 797 (8th Cir. 1953); United States v. Bianco,
189 F.2d 716 (3rd Cir. 1951); United States v. Heitner,
149 F.2d 105 (2d Cir. 1945); Wisniewski v. United
States, 47 F.2d 825 (6th Cir. 1931).
9Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 312 n.4
(1959), vesting police officers with power to arrest upon
probable cause generated by hearsay information, was
presaged by Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160,
172-74 (1949). See also McCray v. fllinois, 386 U.S.
300 (1967).
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the Court to hold that warrants could issue upon
hearsay information, 0 which, in turn, created the
need for criteria by which a magistrate could test
the reliability of the hearsay information. Thus
arose the Court's controversial decision in Aguilar
V. Texas."

In Aguilar two Houston police officers applied
for a warrant to search a home for narcotics on the
basis of "reliable information from a credible person." Finding the exposition far too conclusory to
warrant a magistrate's finding of probable cause,
Mr. Justice Goldberg's opinion articulated the now
famous two-pronged test to be used by magistrates
in assessing the sufficiency of information intended
to produce a warrant. As a constitutional yardstick for evaluating hearsay in a warrant application, the magistrate, said the Court, had to be
informed of (1) some of the underlying circumstances relied upon by the person providing the
affiant with information and (2) some of the circumstances indicating that the person supplying
the information to the affiant was credible or his
12
information reliable.
After observing the reaction to its decision in
Aguilar, 3 the Court, counseled by experience, accepted review of the Eighth Circuit's divided en
banc determination in United States v. Spinelli.14
The affadavit in question asserted that the F.B.I.
had observed Spinelli going to an apartment containing two telephones and that an informer had
said that Spinelli was conducting a gambling operation using two telephones with certain numbers,
which matched the numbers of the phones in the
apartment Spinelli had visited. The Supreme
Court, in Spinelli v. United States,15 reversed the
Eighth Circuit's conclusion that the affadavit was
sufficient to establish probable cause.
10See Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 270-71
(1960).
11373 U.S. 108 (1964).

'2Id. at 114.
'3 See, e.g., United States v. Pinkerman, 374 F.2d 988
(4th Cir. 1967); United States v. Freeman, 358 F.2d
459 (2d Cir. 1966); Smith v. United States, 358 F.2d
833 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Commonwealth v. Brown, 354
Mass. 337, 237 N.E.2d 53 (1968); Ludwig v. State,
215 So. 2d 898 (Fla. App. 1968); Comment, Informers
Word as Basis for ProbableCause in the FederalCourts,
53 CALrx. L. R1v. 840 (1965).

'4382 F.2d 871 (8th Cir. 1967) (en banc). Mr.
Justice Blackmun, a member of the Eighth Circuit
majority which upheld the warrant in Spinelli, remains
firm in his belief that the circuit court's opinion was correct and that the Supreme Court erred in reversing. See
Harris v. United States, 403 U.S. 573, 585-86 (1971)
(Blackmun, J., concurring).
1

393 U.S. 410 (1969). Mr. Justice Harlan wrote the

plurality opinion in which three of his brethren joined.
Justices Black, Fortas and Stewart issued separate
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Rather than clarify the law in this area, the
Court's splintered decision in Spinelli only served
to complicate and confuse the situation. While it
is difficult to extract any clearly focused principles
of law from the opinion, the decision, on its facts,
seemed to elevate the evidentiary standards necessary to satisfy Aguilar's dual criteria. The plurality
opinion found the detail set forth in the affidavit,
even though partially corroborated, insufficient
under Aguilar because the information disclosed
no more than a series of innocent acts coupled with
a naked conclusion of criminal activity. However,
since Draperv. United States 6 had previously upheld a warrantless arrest based upon an informant's tip which, while disclosing nothing particularly sinister, was so detailed as to be self-verifying,
the Court went to great lengths to distinguish
Draperin terms of the amount of detail provided by
the informant. Consequently, the evidentiary detail which, pursuant to Spineli, must be provided
the magistrate before he could constitutionally
discharge his function, according to Mr. Justice
Black, "expands Aguilar to almost unbelievable
proportions.' 7
The antimony presented by the self-verifying information notions of Draper and the elaborate
specificity required under Spineli's evidentiary
expansion of the Aguilar doctrine made it "perhaps
not the easiest task for a lower court to walk the
5
logical tightrope of Draper-Aguilar-Spinelli".
In this context of judicial confusion, an individual
named Roosevelt Harris was convicted for possessing non-taxpaid liquor. The verdict was primarily
secured by evidence obtained pursuant to a search
warrant and, therefore, his appeal to the Sixth
Circuit concerned only the sufficiency of the affadavit upon which the warrant was predicated.
dissents. Justice Marshall did not participate. The
pivotal vote was Justice White's concurrence which was
premised upon a somewhat dubious foundation:
Pending full-scale reconsideration of [Draper],
on the one hand, or of the Nahanson-Aguilarcases
on the other, I join the opinion of the Court and
the judgment of reversal, especially since a vote to
affirm would produce an equally divided Court.
Id. at 429.
16358 U.S. 307 (1959).
17Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 429 (1969)
(Black, J., dissenting).
18 United States v. Mitchell 425 F.2d 1353, 1360
(8th Cir. 1970) (Blackmun, J.3. In Mitchell, Justice
Blackmun, then Circuit Judge, first expressed disenchantment with the Supreme Court's disposition of
Spindli and, by relying upon Draper,saw a means of
avoiding Spindli's rigors. As to the tension between
Draper and Aguilar-Spinelli, see Note, The Informer's
Tip as ProbableCausefor Search or Arrest, 54 CORNELL.
L. Rnv. 958 (1969).

In a per curiam opinion, the Sixth Circuit, relying on the Aguilar-Spinelli analysis, reversed the
conviction. 9 That court found that the first prong
of Aguilar was satisfied because the hearsay declarant visually observed the facts asserted 0
However, the second requirement of Aguilar-a
basis for confirming the out-of-court declarant's
credibility-was held to be lacking. The issue came
to the Supreme Court in this posture.
With Chief Justice Burger writing the plurality
opinion, the Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit" and indicated a willingness to take into account the totality of the circumstances under
which the warrant was issued.m This willingness
was manifested by a resurrection of the "substantial basis" test enuciated by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Jones v. United States. Thus, under
Harris,the affidavit must be considered as a whole
to determine whether the informant's report,
19United States v. Harris, 412 F.2d 796 (6th Cir.
1969).
"0Generally, where personal observation of a crime
occurs, the first prong of the Aguilar test is satisfied
and the question is reduced to whether the informant
is credible or his information reliable. See e.g., United
States v. Suarez, 380 F.2d 713 (2d Cir. 1997); Coyne v.
Watson, 282 F. Supp. 235 (S.D. Ohio 1967); State v.
Snyder, 12 Ariz. App. 142, 468 P.2d 593 (1970); People
v. Scoma, 78 Cal. Rptr. 491, 455 P.2d 419 (1969);
Sturgeon v. State, 483 P.2d 335 (Okla. Crim. App.
1971); Manley v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 146, 176
S.E.2d 309 (1970).
2L403 U.S. 573 (1971). The Chief Justice's opinion
was divided into three parts, holding that: (1) a factual
basis for deeming the informant reliable existed; (2)
Spinell was wrong in failing to take into account the
affiant's knowledge of a suspect's reputation; and (3)
declarations against penal interest by an informant are
indicia of reliability. Justice Black, who would have
overruled Aguilar and Spinelli, and Justice Blackmun,
who would have overruled Spinelli, concurred in all
threeparts of the opinion. Justice Stewart concurred in
Part Iand Justice White, the pivotal vote in Spinelli
concurred in Part III. Justice Harlan, who authored
Spinelli, wrote for the four dissenters.
22Mr.Justice Harlan's statement in Spineli that
"the 'totality of the circumstances' approach.., paints
with too broad a brush," 393 U.S. at 415, was, thereby,
implicitly rejected.
23362 U.S. 257, 271-72 (1960):
We conclude therefore that hearsay may be the
basis for a warrant. We cannot say that there was
so little basis for accepting the hearsay here that
the Commissioner acted improperly. The Commissioner need not have been convinced of the
presence of narcotics in the apartment. He might
have found the affidavit insufficient and withheld
his warrant. But there was substantial basis for him
to conclude that narcotics were probably present
in the apartment, and that is sufficient.
We have decided that, as hearsay alone does not
render an affidavit insufficient, the Commissioner
need not have required the informants or their
affidavits to be produced ...so long as there was
a substantial basis for crediting the hearsay.
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coupled with the corroborating information, provides a "substantial basis" upon which to determine
the existence of probable cause.24
While some commentators have interpreted
Harris' "substantial basis" approach to have undermined the mechanical tests of Aguilar or, at
least, to have obfuscated the line between its
prongs, 25 it is doubtful that the Court went so far.
Rather, since there was no dispute that the detailed personal observation provided by the Harris
informant was sufficient to satisfy the first A guilar
test,26 the issue was reduced to the quantum of information necessary to establish the informant's
credibility. Although Aguilar was not abandoned,
the Court apparently reduced the burden for satisfying the second prong of the test to a standard less
exacting than that envisioned by Spinelli. The
Chief Justice, relying heavily upon a number of preSpinelli decisions, suggested a more flexible approach to examining probable cause affidavits
which would avoid "hypertechnicality" and rely
upon "the factual and practical considerations of
everyday life on which reasonable and prudent
men, not legal technicians, act."n7
Because the affadavit held valid in Harris would
probably have been rejected under a literal reading
of Spinelli28 it is not unreasonable to assume that
the thrust of Harris was to relax the elaborate
specificity required by Spinelli to satisfy the second
prong of the Aguilar test. One court has clearly
stated that "while adhering in general to the
Aguilar decision, the Supreme Court clearly indicated the burden for satisfying the so-called second
prong of Aguilar was not as stringent as Spinelli
had indicated." 29 Upon this thesis, the courts, both
24403 U.S. at 581.
21See, e.g., Note, 40

FoRDIAM L.RFv. 687, 696 n.61
(1972);
Note, 47 Nom D~r; LAWYER 632, 638 (1972).
2
6 Compare 403 U.S. at 578-79 vith 403 U.S. at 589
(Harlan, J., dissenting). Although Justice Harlan found
the information sufficient to satisfy the first test, he
specifically rejected the notion that it was so detailed
as to be self-verifying. Id. at 593.
27403 U.S. at 583. In reaching this conclusion the
Chief Justice relied upon and quoted Brinegar v.
United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949) and United
States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108 (1965). Moreover, he expressly adopted the language of Mr. Justice
Fortas' dissent in Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 438, to the
extent that it indicates that "[a] policeman's affidavit
should not be judged as an entry in an essay contest."
403 U.S. at 579.
28See The Supreme Court 1970 Term, 85 HAIv. L.
REv. 3, 56 (1971).
29 United States v. Unger, 469 F.2d 1283, 1286 (7th
Cir. 1972), petition for cert. docketed, 41 U.S.L.W. 3575
(U.S. April 3, 1973). See alse United States v. McNally,
-F.2d-(lst Cir. 1973); United States v. Sequella-
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state 0 and federal, 3' have given credence to the
teachings of Harrisinsofar as it concerns the quantum of information necessary to satisfy the reliability of the informant prong of Aguilar.n
While Harrisconcededly did not depart from the
long line of cases voiding warrants procured on the
basis of mere suspicions,n it did signal an abandonment of the rigidity of technical nicety in the review
of affadavits for warrants. Therefore, contemporary warrant applications must be tested upon preSpinelli common sense considerations of practical
accuracy. Concluding the Harris opinion, Chief
Justice Burger stated that "tilt will not do to say
that warrants may not issue on uncorroborated
hearsay. This only avoids the issues of whether there
is reason for crediting the out-of-court statement.' ' u
By holding that reason for crediting the hearsay
statements of informers could exist without the
elaborate specificity deemed necessary under
Spinelli, the Harrisdecision paved the road toward
total acceptance of the innovative citizen-informant concept that has been discussed and applied in
some jurisdictions, but never fully articulated and
accepted on a national scale.
At the outset, it must be recognized that the
question of whether citizen informants must be
shown to be reliable in the same way and to the
same extent as a police informant is of more than
academic significance. One of the prime methods
used to demonstrate reliability of an informant is
to show that the informant has furnished accurate
Avendo, 447 F.2d 575, 579 n.18 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 985 (1971). That the effect of Harrisupon the
Aguilar-Spinelli doctrine is by no means clear is evidenced by the three separate opinions in United States
v. Marihart, 472 F.2d 809, (8th Cir. 1972) (en banc).
30See, e.g., State v. Perry, 59 N.J. 383, 390, 283 A.2d

330, 334 n.3 (1971); State v. Flowers, 12 N.C. App.
487, 492, 183 S.E.2d 820, 822-23 (1971); Pierce v.
State, 491 P.2d 335, 336 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971);
State
v. Curtis, 489 P.2d 962 (Ore. App. 1971).
3
1See, e.g., United States v. Guinn, 454 F.2d 29,
33-35 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v. Roman, 451
F.2d 579, 581 (4th Cir. 1971); United States ex rel. Di
Rienzo
v. Yeager, 443 F.2d 228, 230 (3rd Cir. 1971).
32
1 A review of the Harrisdecision, indicating that the
"Supreme Court dealt harshly with the standard of proof
that had evolved under Aguilar and Spinelli, seemingly
altering its content," is set forth in an analogous context
in Comment, Controverting Probable Cause In Facially

Sufficient Affidavits, 63 J.Cimu.L.C. & P.S. 41, 43-44
(1972).
1 See, e.g., Whitley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560 (1971);
Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964); Nathanson v.
United States, 290 U.S. 41 (1933). Cf. Giordenello v.
United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958).
34403 U.S. at 584.
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information in the past. However, the citizen informant

forcement when he reports crimes to the police
either automatically satisfies the reliability of the
informant prong of Aguilar or, as expressed in a
usually would not have more than one opportunity
similar manner by the Illinois supreme court in
to supply information to the police, thereby prePeople v. Hoffman, 3 renders prior reliability uncluding proof of his reliability by pointing to
necessary.39
previous accurate information which he has supIn Hoffman an unidentified citizen told police
plied.n
officers that she had seen a man with a vulgarism
Thus, if the same rules which apply to proving the
written on his forehead go into a restaurant. The
reliability of police informants apply to citizen inpolicemen went into the restaurant and were met
formants, the affiant is faced with the difficult task
with resistance in attempting to make an arrest.
6
of demonstrating reliability in other ways.
On appeal from a conviction for resisting arrest,
The citizen-informant doctrine, which would
defendant's contention that no probable cause exavoid this anomaly, is predicated upon the fact
isted to arrest him was rejected. The police ofthat very different credibility considerations exist
ficers were justified in relying on the information
when warrants are issued upon information supreceived from the woman because the standard
plied by an ordinary citizen as opposed to an
"requirement of prior reliability which must be
anonymous police informant. Police informants,
met when police act upon 'tips' from professional
for the most part, receive something in exchange
informers does not apply to information supplied
for the information they supply, be it money or
by ordinary citizens." 4
favorable consideration in connection with a
Perhaps the best rationale for considering citicharge pending against them. Since the police inzen-eyewitness information to be inherently reliformant's information is self-serving, it must be
able can be derived from the law of evidence.
considered suspect; and, therefore, before a search
The hearsay rule requires certain evidence to be
warrant can be issued upon such information, the
excluded at trial because it is thought to be
judicial officer must be advised of some of the
unreliable; but, by the same token, numerous
underlying reasons from which the affiant conexceptions to the rule have been developed becluded that the informant was reliable. However,
cause certain kinds of hearsay evidence are inwhere an ordinary citizen supplies the information,
herently reliable.a4 Citizen-eyewitness information
there is no reason, for deeming the information
generally takes a form similar to declarations
self-serving or suspect and, therefore, a substantial
that fall within certain exceptions to the hearsay
basis for crediting the out-of-court statement exists
rule and should, therefore, be accorded the same
by the mere fact that the information is furnished
respect in terms of reliability. Moreover, since
by a citizen.
it is axiomatic that probable cause can be preThis distinction was clearly articulated by the
dicated upon evidence that would not necessarily
Supreme Court of Wisconsin in State v. Paszek.
be admissible at trial,4' it seems clear that extra[Ain ordinary citizen who reports a crime which
"845111l 2d 221, 258 N.E.2d. 326 (1970).
"9Whether a citizen informer is automatically
has been committed in his presence, or that a
deemed to satisfy the reliability prong of Aguilar or to
crime is being or will be commited, stands on
render the prong inapplicable is a distinction without a
much different ground than a police informer.
substantive difference. While the former supports
He is a witness to criminal activity who acts with
strict adherence to the mechanical tests of Aguilar,
the latter seems less fictive. See United States v. Unger,
an intent to aid the police in law enforcement be469 F.2d 1283, 1287 n.4 (7th Cir. 1972).
cause of his concern for society or for his own
4045 Ill.
2d at 226, 258 N.E.2d at 328. Accord,
safety. He does not expect any gain or concession
People v. Lewis, 240 Cal. App. 2d 546, 49 Cal. Rptr.
in exchange for his information.
579 (1966); People v. Hester, 39 Ill.
2d 489, 237 N.E.2d
446 (1968), cerl. dismissed as improvidently granted,
Thus, a citizen who acts openly in aid of law en- 397 U.S. 660 (1970).
415 J. WIGMOPE, EvDFcNC
§1422, at 204 (3rd ed.
"1State v. Paszek, 50 Wis. 2d 619, 630-31, 184 1940).
N.W.2d 836, 843 (1971).
42 "There is a large difference between the two things
36 Adair v. State, 482 S.W.2d 247 (Tex. Crim. App.
to be proved ...as well as between the tribunals
1972) illustrates the practical difficulty created for determine them, and therefore a like difference which
in the
both law enforcement officers and reviewing courts if quanta and modes of proof required to establish them."
prior reliability cannot be used to show an informant's Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 312 (1959). See
reliability.
also United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 582 (1971);
'750 Wis. 2d 619, 630, 184 N.W.2d 836, 843 (1971).
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 174 (1949).
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judicial statements bearing attributes similar to
recognized hearsay exceptions are sufficiently reliable for purposes of probable cause.
The Chief Justice employed this rationale in
Harris to reach the conclusion that admissions
against penal interest, although perhaps not sufficiently reliable to constitute evidenceat trial,"carry
their own indicia of credibility-sufficient at least
to support a finding of probable cause to search."3
Since statements in the form of marginal hearsay
exceptions are sufficient to generate probable
cause, the reliability of information supplied to
police can be determined, as an analytical matter,
by resort to the rules of evidence. As the Chief
Justice emphasized in Harris,the statements need
not fall directly within a hearsay exception so as to
be competent trial evidence; but a statement that
carries its own "indicia of credibility" will suffice.
A recognized exception to the hearsay rule exists
where a statement is uttered under the stress of an
exciting event which suspends the powers of reflection and fabrication and, thereby, renders the
statement reliable." Three basic requirements must
be fulfilled, under Professor Wigmore's analysis,
before the "spontaneous exclamation" or, as sometimes termed, "excited utterance" hearsay exception becomes viable: (1) a startling event must
occur which shocks the declarant into a state of
nervous excitement and causes him to (2) make a
statement while under the stress of the event which
(3) relates to the circumstances of the event. 4
While most information supplied to the police by
ordinary citizens falls within this strict definition,
a more precise study of the spontaneous exclamation exception reveals that the doctrine is not so
stringent as the requirements appear. Thus, a brief
examination of each separate element of the exception, as interpreted by the courts, demonstrates
43403 U.S. at 583. See also United States ex rel. Di
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that a broad range of information provided police
officers comes within the perimeters of the analogy.
The initial requirement under the excited utterance exception requires the perception of an event
which "might so excite and control the mind of the
speaker that his statements are natural and spontaneous and therefore, sincere and trustworthy"."
Neither Wig-more nor the case law limits the kind of
act or event capable of causing excitement to a particularized situation. Since a variety of events
which would be considered nonstartling in contrast
to the observation of a crime in progress have been
found sufficient to trigger the exception,4 it is unnecessary for present purposes to review the
amorphous mass of case law involving events which
the courts considered startling.
The second element necessary to satisfy the excited utterance exception involves the time of the
declaration. "The utterance must have been before
there has been time to contrive and misrepresent."4
However, it is clear that the statements "need not
be strictly contemporaneous with the existing cause;
they may be subsequent to it, provided that there
has not been time for the exciting influence to lose
its sway and be dissipated.

' 49

While the cases on

the permissible time lag between the event and the
declaration are disparate," it is clear that "there
can beno definite and fixed limit of time ....Thus,

the application of the principle thus depends entirely on the circumstances of each case". 51
Finally, Wigmore required the declaration to relate to the circumstances of the occurrence causing
it in order to be admissible as an excited utterance.
Although some cases have written this requirement away in the ordinary hearsay exception situa46McWilliams,

The Admissibility of Spontaneous

Declarations,
21 CAmF. L. Rxv. 460, 464 (1933).
47
See generally Comment, Spontaneous Exclamations
in the Absence of a Startling Event, 46 CoLwm. L. Rxv.

430 (1946).
48

6 J. WsicoRE, supra note 41, §1750, at 142 (em-

Rienzo v. Yeager, 443 F.2d 228, 230 (3rd Cir. 1971);
People v. Saiken, 49 Ill. 2d 504, 512, 275 N.E.2d 381,
386-87 (1971). The Chief Justice's use of declarations
against penal interest as an element of reliability was
foreshadowed by Justice White's comment that if "the
informer's hearsay comes from one of the actors in the
crime in the nature of admission against interest, the
affidavit giving this information should be held sufficient." Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 425
(1969) (White, J., concurring).

phasis in original).
49Id. (emphasis in original). See also Morgan, The

C. McCOMuICK, EvmENcE §272, at 578-84

141 F.2d 648 (9th Cir. 1944) (1 hour and J hour re-

4See

(1954); Hutchins & Slesinger, Spontaneous Exclamations, 28 COLum. L. REv. 432 (1928).
46

6 J. WIGMoRE, supra note 41, at §1750. See also

United States v. Bell, 351 F.2d 868, 872 (6th Cir.
1965); Murphy Auto Parts Co. v. Ball, 249 F.2d 508
(D.C. Cir. 1957) (Burger, J.).

Law of Evidence, 1941-45, 59 HAxv. L. Xxv. 481,

574-76 (1946); Vicksburg & M.R. Co. v. O'Brien, 119
U.S.
99 (1886).
50

See, e.g., United States v. McIntire, 461 F.2d 1092
(5th Cir. 1972) (about an hour); Wheeler v. United
States, 211 F.2d 19 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (within an hour);
Guthrie v. United States, 207 F.2d 19 (D.C. Cir. 1953)
(11 hours); Standard Accident Ins. Co. v. Heatfield,
spectively for two statements); Bennett v. Bennett, 92
N.H. 379, 31 A.2d 374 (1943) (4 hours); State v. Smith,
200 S.C. 188, 20 S.E.2d 726 (1942) (30 minutes to 1j
hours).
516 J. WIGMORE, supra note 41, §1750, at 143-44
(emphasis in original).
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tion," it would be an essentiality in considering the
reliability of information supplied by a citizen.
Since the event that raises the excitement should
be the subject of the ensuing warrant application,
it is necessary that the statement of the citizen to
police officials directly relate to what he observed. But, it should be noted that the spontaneous exclamation exception has been applied to
statements made in response to interrogation where
the sway of the exciting event has not dissipated."
Thus, the reliability of information given in response to police investigative work occurring immediately after a crime has been committed should
likewise be considered reliable for warrant purposes if, in response to a question, a citizen-eyewitness provides information relating to the offense
under investigation.
Of course, it is difficult to compare the essential
features of a given hearsay exception to a citizeninformant situation without assessing the particular
facts and circumstances under which the citizen
supplies information to the police. However, as a
theoretical matter, the analogy appears sound.
Moreover, as the law of evidence with respect to
the admissibility of hearsay at trial becomes increasingly liberalized--apparently reflecting a
consensus that more kinds of hearsay evidence are
reliable--it does not seem unreasonable to broaden
the scope of information that will constitutionally
authorize the issuance of a warrant. Consistent
with the theory underlying exceptions to the hear-

say rule, information given to the police by those
who observe the commission of a crime, whether
victim or bystander, should be deemed sufficient to
generate probable cause to arrest and search. The
credence given such information rests in part upon
the common sense notion that a responsible citizen, as opposed to a paid informant, will not disregard the consequences of supplying inaccurate information to police.5
While the citizen-informant doctrine has not
been widely adopted, there appear to be no overwhelming barriers to its judicial acceptance. Although the cases do not generally articulate the
foregoing rationale, they do uniformly conclude
that, in situations involving on-the-scene apprehension of suspects, information supplied by citizenobservers is sufficiently reliable to establish probable cause. For example, in Chambersv. Maroneyfe a
gas station attendant gave the police a description
of the men who robbed him and two teenagers
identified an auto that they had seen speeding away
from a parking lot near the scene of the crime. The
Supreme Court concluded that "[h]aving talked to
the teenage observers and to the victim" the
police had "ample cause" to stop the auto and arrest its occupants.7 Chambers' probable cause pronouncement was followed in United States v.
Trotter,ss where a bartender who had cashed what
he believed to be a counterfeit bill alerted the
police and described the auto in which the defendants were riding. The ensuing arrest and search
were found proper.
This line of cases is best exemplified by Chief
Justice Burger's opinion, when Circuit Judge, in
Brown v. United States. There, the police received
information from an unknown victim of a crime
which was radioed to other officers who, thereafter,
apprehended the defendant. To the defendant's
claim that the information was insufficient to establish probable cause, the Chief Justice forcefully responded:

2See, e.g., Murphy Auto Parts Co. v. Ball, 249
F.2d 508 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Tenzeno v. State, 484
S.W.2d 374 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
"1See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Rummage, 359 Pa.
483, 486 59 A.2d 65, 67 (1948); General Schuyler Ins.
Co. v. Shustick, 35 Ohio L. Abs. 205, 207, 40 N.E.2d
485, 487 (Ohio App. 1941) (dictum).
UFD. R. Ev., 804(b) (2) (1971 Revised Draft) exempts from the operation of the hearsay rule any
statement, not in response to the instigation of a
person engaged in investigating, litigating, or settling a claim, which narrates, describes, or explains an event or condition recently perceived by
the declarant, made in good faith, not in contemAlthough the police could not here judge the replation of pending or anticipated litigation in which
he was interested, and while his recollection was
liability of the information on the basis of past
dear.
experience with the informant, the victim's report
This rule represents a crystallization and extension of
has the virtue of being based on personal obserthe efforts of Wigmore and Morgan to create an orderly
vation ... and is less likely to be colored by selfanalytic basis upon which to apply the chaotic--and
now outmoded--concept of res gestae. Since the predeinterest than is that of an informant. Admittedly
termined reliability of evidence of this nature saves it
a crime victim's observation may be faulty in some
from a confrontation clause violation, cf. Duton v.
Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970), information provided the
35 See text accompanying notes 75-77 infra.
police, falling within the contours of the rule, should
ss 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
certainly pass the reliability test of Aguilar in the
57Id. at 46.
probable cause setting. However, by its own terms, it
"8433 F.2d 133 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
would not apply to information elicited by police ques- 942 (1971).
tioning.
59 365 F.2d 976 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
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respects, as it may have been here; however, the

plicable to every citizen who assists the police." 6

mistakes are irrelevant if there is sufficient par-

Since Lewis, the California courts have articulated
the citizen-informant concept as black letter law:
"A citizen who purports to be a victim of or to have
witnessed a crime is a reliable informant even
though his reliability has not theretofore been
proved or tested.6
A great number of other jurisdictions have followed California's lead in holding that information
supplied by a citizen is automatically reliable.
These cases are generally predicated upon the
ground that a citizen who supplies such information
has nothing to gain-and perhaps something to
lose-by so acting, that his personal observations
can be trusted because of the absence of a motive to
falsify, that ordinary citizens generally have no
previous transactions with the police disclosing
prior reliability, and that activity in the aid of law
enforcement should be encouraged. Consequently,
where an ordinary citizen offers information about
criminal activity, a warrant may issue or an arrest
ensue without a factual basis for deeming the
65
informant reliable.
The federal courts, while recognizing the states'
increasing acceptance of the citizen-informant
doctrine 6 6 have proceeded somewhat differently.
The federal cases have distinguished the classical
police informant from the ordinary eyewitness for
purposes of the reliability criterion of Aguilar and
Spinelli, and have placed emphasis upon the
automatic reliability of an eyewitness, whether
victim, bystander or accomplice, with only passing
regard for the underlying factors which the states
find to enhance the ordinary citizen's reliability.
United States v. Bell67 specifically ditinguished the
eyewitness situation from that of the police in-

ticularized information to constitute probable
cause. Except in those few cases where cameras are
part of a burglar alarm system, most reports are
likely to be less than perfect.6
Although the courts have not grounded their
decisions upon reliability of information expressed

in terms of hearsay exceptions such as spontaneous
exclamations, it is clear from the foregoing examples that information supplied by a citizen-eyewitness is entitled to great weight in determining
probable cause.6 ' An ever-increasing number of
jurisdictions have therefore cast aside the customary analytical tools for determining probable cause
and have squarely embraced the citizen-informant
concept. In these jurisdictions, the reliability of the
individual supplying information to the police need
not be buttressed by supporting facts where it appears that he is a citizen outside the criminal environment.
The leading case on the subject appears to be
Peoplc v. Lewis,62 where a Mr. Owens witnessed a
burglary and identified a man on the street nearby

as the perpetrator of the offense. Holding the arrest
andl search of the person so identified to be proper,
the California Court of Appeals reasoned that the
only alternatives available to the police officer at
the moment were to place credence in the citizen's
information or allow the suspect to flee. Since the
latter alternative was highly undesirable if any
credence could be given to the citizen's information,
the court analyzed the various differences between
"stool pigeons" and citizens in terms of measuring
the reliability of their information. It concluded by
upholding the arrest and search on the ground that
the tests of reliability which must be applied to
ordinary police informants "are not necessarily ap61 Id.

at 979.
61See also Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99

(1967) (cab drivers who responded to shouts of "holdup" notified police); Keeny v. Swanson, 458 F.2d 680,
683 (8th Cir. 1972) (gas station attendant gave police
description of auto); Coleman v. United States, 420
F.2d 616 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (bank employee gave description of bank robbers' get-away car); Lewis v. United
States, 417 F.2d 755, 758 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (gas station
attendant who observed robbery of liquor store notified
police); Daniels v. United States, 393 F.2d 359 (D.C.
Cir. 1968) (victim of purse snatcher gave assailant's
description); Dailey v. United States, 365 F.2d 640
(10th Cir. 1966) (shop owner who received counterfeit
bill saw defendant later in the evening and notified
police); United States v. Jones, 340 F.2d 913, 914 (7th
Cir. 1964) (citizen halted police and told them that
two men seated in a parked car were waiting to kill him).
62240 Cal. App. 2d 546, 49 Cal. Rptr. 579 (1966).

6

3Id.
at 550, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 582.
r People v. Bevins, 6 Cal. App. 3d 421, 425, 85 Cal.
Rptr. 876, 879 (1970). See also People v. Hogan, 71 Cal.
2d 888, 80 Cal. Rptr. 28, 457 P.2d 868 (1969); People v.
Gardner, 252 Cal. App. 2d 320, 60 Cal. Rptr. 321
(1967); People v. Griffin, 250 Cal. App. 2d 545, 58 Cal.
Rptr. 707 (1967).
65See, e.g., People v. Glubman, 485 P.2d 711 (Colo.
1971); State v. Mazzadora, 28 Conn. Supp. 252, 258
A.2d 310, 315 (1969); Walker v. State, 196 So. 2d 8
(Fla. App. 1967); People v. Hoffman, 45 Ill.
2d 221, 258
N.E.2d 446 (1968), People v. Hester, 39 Ill.
2d 489,
237 N.E.2d 446 (1968), cert. dismissed as improvidently
granted, 397 U.S. 660 (1970); Yantis v. State, 476
S.W.2d 24, 27 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972); Brown v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 672, 187 S.E.2d 160 (1972); Guzewicz v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 730, 187 S.E.2d 144
(1972); State v. Paszek, 50 Wis. 2d 619, 184 N.W.2d
836 (1971).
66 See Pendleton v. Nelson, 404 F.2d 1074, 1075 (9th
Cir. 1968).
67457 F.2d 1231 (5th Cir. 1972).
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formant with respect to credibility questions upon
which a magistrate issuing a warrant must pass.
The court recognized that the rationale behind the
reliability of the informant prong of Aguilar was
to insure that search warrants are not issued on the
basis of idle rumor or irresponsible conjecture
which, passing through the criminal community, is
seized upon by an informant to ingratiate himself
to the police. But, because eyewitnesses by definition are not passing along idle rumor, since they
either have been the victims of the crime or have
otherwise seen some portion of it, the rationale behind the reliability requirement of Aguilar has no
application. "A 'neutral and detached magistrate'
could adequately assess the probative value of an
eye-witness's information because, if it is reasonable and accepted as true, the magistrate must believe that it is based upon first-hand knowledge."61
If any rule of general applicability can be discerned
from the federal cases, it is not that a citizen who
supplies information is automatically reliable regardless of the qualitative value of the information
he supplies, but rather that, where the information
provided appears reasonably true, "lain informant
who alleges he is an 'eye-witness' to an actual crime
perpetrated demonstrates sufficient 'reliability' of
the person."6
None of the above should be taken to suggest
that there are no dangers involved in complete,
blind acceptance of the citizen-informant doctrine.
Courts must be on guard to protect the fourth
amendment rights of individuals against one who
would, under the guise of being a responsible citizen
who had witnessed a crime, supply false information to the police to fulfill a personal vendetta. To
protect against fourth amendment infringements
resulting from such purposefully false information,
the details supplied by the asserted responsible
citizen should be, to a certain extent, so complete
as to be self-verifying. This is not to say that the
information should be sufficient to generate selfverification under Spinelli'sassessment of Draper,70
8
6
Id.at 1238-39.
69
McCreary v. Sigler, 406 F.2d 1264, 1269 (8th Cir.
1969). See also United States v. Roman, 451 F.2d 579,
581 (4th Cir. 1971) (eyewitness); United States v.
Mahler 442 F 2d 1172, 1174-75 (9th Cir. 1971) (victim); United States v. Wilcox, 437 F.2d 52, 54-55 (Sth
Cir. 1971) (eyewitness); Scbnepp v. Hocker, 429 F.2d
1096, 1100 (9th Cir. 1970) (victim); Trimble v. United
States, 369 F.2d 950, 951 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (victim);
Coyne v. Watson, 282 F. Supp. 235, 237 (S.D. Ohio
1967), a.ff'd mem., 392 F.2d 585 (6th Cir. 1968) (unidentified eyewitness).
70See text accompanying note 16 supra.

for such a demand would, by definition, render
reliability considerations unnecessary. However,
the fact that information is offered by an ordinary
citizen, coupled with a tender of information in
sufficient detail so as to reasonably avoid the
appearance of fabrication, is enough to create
probable cause. "In sum, the internal content of the
affidavit intriniscally proves the truth of the
'responsible' citizen's word.""
A suitable benchmark for determining the circumstances in which the citizen's word should be
taken as true is found in United States v. Unger. 72
The defendant was found guilty of possessing
unregistered firearms which were seized pursuant
to a warrant obtained by the Chicago policeY3
The warrant application stated that an unnamed
citizen, while working in the basement of an
apartment building, had occasion to observe a cache
of weapons through an opening in an enclosed
locker. Because of his military experience, he was
able to identify the weapons for the police. He also
pointed out the building in question for the police
and drew a diagram of the basement location of
the locker.
Upholding the trial judge's denial of a motion to
suppress, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit analyzed the impact of Harris upon the
law governing search warrants and concluded by
finding that, in the context of a citizen-informant
situation, the information in the complaint was
sufficiently self-verifying to attest to the citizen's
reliability. Judge Duffy's opinion announced that,
although a police officer's opinion of the reliability
of a citizen-informant was alone insufficient to
show probable cause, when coupled with information in a complaint which attested to its own
integrity by the specificity with which it was
stated and some degree of corroboration, a warrant
could properly issue.74
71 United States v. Roman, 451 F.2d 579, 581 (4th
Cir. 1971). See also United States v. Unger, 469 F.2d
1283, 1286 (7th Cir. 1972); United States v. Evans, 447
F.2d 129, 132 (8th Cir. 1971).
22469 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1972).
73 As often occurs in cases of this nature, Unger
evolved from an investigation conducted by local police
who, upon discovering a federal violation, referred their
findings to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms. Because referrals of this nature generally take
place after the contraband is seized, the federal government is unable to supervise the warrant procedure and
must take the warrant as it finds it.
74 469 F.2d at 1287. That some degree of corroboration is necessary for a citizen's tip to generate probable
cause, even in the jurisdiction in which the citizen-in-
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While courts should demand an acceptable level
of detail in the information supplied, there are
several other factors effectuating the design of the
fourth amendment in the citizen-informant context. These factors are manifested in a number of
considerations militating against the knowing
transmission of false information to the police.
Because a citizen who supplies false information
about a crime subjects himself to potential criminal
and civil penalties, a variety of sanctions exists to
deter a vindictive tender of misinformation.
False information given to a federal agent for
purposes of initiating a criminal investigation
may subject the supplier to criminal prosecutionY5
Moreover, some states, by a number of differently
labeled statutes, make the false report of criminal
activity punishable as a misdemeanory 6 Therefore,
criminal penalties await one who would purposefully give false information of illegal conduct.
Similarly, a tender of false information may subject
the supplier to pecuniary liability. While false
information given to police officers may be insufficient to support a civil cause of action for false
formant doctrine was founded, is made apparent by
People v. Zimnicki, 29 Cal. App. 3d 577, 105 Cal. Rptr.
614 (1972).
75There is a conflict in the circuits as to whether
supplying false information to the F.B.I. is cognizable
under the federal false statements statute, 18 U.S.C.
§1001 (1970). Compare United States v. Adler, 380
F.2d 917 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1006 (1967)
(finding offense) wil Friedman v. United States, 374
F.2d 363 (8th Cir. 1967). Significantly, both courts were
particularly concerned with whether the prosecution of
false information of this nature would inhibit citizens
from supplying information to the police and, thereby,
stultify the desirable resulting effects. Different conclusions on this subject were in no small part responsible
for the conflicting results. But see Note, 5 HouSTON L.
REv.548, 553 (1968) ("The affirmative giving of false
information, initiated knowingly and willfully, clearly
falls within the prohibition of Section 1001.") Cf. Bryson v. United States, 396 U.S. 64, 71 & n.4 (1969) (approving Adler analysis and leaving open question of
whether
Friedmanis good law).
7
1 E.g., IL. REV. STAT, Ch. 38, §26-1 (1972), provides in pertinent part:
(a) A person commits disorderly conduct when
he knowingly:
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imprisonment if the ensuing arrest based on the
information proves improper, it may create a
litigious issue under state law.7 Thus, the expense
of potential litigation, like possible criminal
punishment, stands as a deterrent to false reports
of crime.
In light of the inherent reliability of citizen
information and the safeguards against its abuse,
sound policy reasons dictate total acceptance of the
citizen-informant doctrine. The interest that the
fourth amendment is designed to protect is,
according to Justice Cardozo, "the social need
that law shall not be flouted by the insolence of
office."7 8 Permitting a police officer to act upon
information supplied by a responsible citizen,
whether victim or bystander, will surely not result
in his flouting the law by the insolence of office.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized the "obligation of all citizens to aid in enforcing the criminal laws."7 9 And Mr. Justice
White has warned that "[n]either the ordinary
citizen nor the confessed criminal should be discouraged from reporting what he knows to the
authorities and from lending his aid to secure
evidence of crime."' 0 In this regard, courts have
countenanced and encouraged the use of paid
informants and undercover agents since time
immemorial." The responsible citizen who presents

1 See Odorizzi v. A.O. Smith Corp., 452 F.2d 229,
231-32 (7th Cir. 1971); Green v. No. 35 Check Exchange, Inc., 77 Ill.
App. 2d 25, 222 N.E.2d 133 (1966);
Shelton v. Barry, 328 Il1. App. 497, 66 N.E.2d 697
(1946). Another possible basis for imposing liability is
malicious prosecution. See, e.g., Sears Roebuck Co. v.
Alexander, 252 Ala. 122,39 So. 2d 570 (1949); Humbert
v. Knutson, 224 Ore. 133, 354 P.2d 826 (1960); Peoples
Protective Life Ins. Co. v. Newhoff, 56 Tenn. App.
346,407 S.W.2d 190 (1966).
78People v. De Fore, 242 N.Y. 13, 17, 150 N.E. 585,
589,
7 cert. denied, 270 U.S. 657 (1926).
9 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,481 (1966). The
Court long ago recognized that the citizen has a protected right to supply information to police officials. See
Inre Quarles, 158 U.S. 532, 535 (1895):
It is the duty and the right, not only of every
peace officer of the United States, but of every citizen, to assist in prosecuting, and in securing the
punishment of, any breach of the peace of the
United States. It is the right, as well as the duty, of
(5) Transmits in any manner to any peace officer,
every citizen, when called upon by the proper offipublic officer or public employee a report to the
cer, to act as part of the posse comitatus in upholdeffect that an offense has been committed, knowing
ing the laws of his country. It is likewise his right
at the time of such transmission that there is no
and his duty to communicate to the executive
reasonable ground for believing that such an offense
officers any information which he has of the comhas been committed.
See also Azsz. Rxv. STAT. ANN. §13-962 (1956) (malicious
mission of an offense against those laws.
procurement of warrant for arrest without probable See generally Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 695
cause); MD.ANN. CODE, art. 27 §150 (1957) (false state- (1972).
ments, etc., to peace or police officers); WAsH. Rv.
9oMassiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 212 (1964)
CODE ANN. §9.62.010 (1961) (malicious prosecution(White, J., dissenting).
81See McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300,308-09 (1967);
abuse of process).
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the police with evidence of a crime should be no
less encouraged, for "it is no part of the policy
underlying the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to discourage citizens from aiding to the
utmost of their ability in the apprehension of
criminals."8
Unfortunately, contemporary disillusionment
rides rampant over the apathy of the citizenry
United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 224 (2d Cir.
1950), aj'd, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). Cf. White v. United
States, 401 U.S. 745 (1971); Bush v. United States, 375
F.2d 602,604-05 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (Burger, J.).
8"Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 488
(1971).

toward becoming "involved" by reporting a crime
to the police. If law enforcement officials are unnecessarily prevented from effectively responding
to the pleas of citizens, apathy will grow and the
duty of the citizen to aid in law enforcement will
remain a paper obligation. Therefore, it is time to
lay to rest any misconception concerning the reliability of an eyewitness to, or victim of, a crime
for purposes of generating probable cause to search.
This would not make the term "citizen" a magic
word to be mechanically inserted in all warrant
applications, but would insure judicial cognizance
of practical considerations and modem realities
in the administration of criminal justice.

